Fundamentos destacados: 89. La palabra “dignidad” aparece en muchos textos e instrumentos internacionales y regionales (véanse los párrafos 45 a 47 supra). Aunque la Convención no menciona ese concepto –que sin embargo aparece en el Preámbulo del Protocolo nº 13 de la Convención, relativo a la abolición de la pena de muerte en todas las circunstancias–, el Tribunal ha subrayado que el respeto de la dignidad humana forma parte de la esencia misma de la Convención (véase Svinarenko y Slyadnev , citado anteriormente, § 118), junto con la libertad humana (véase CR c. Reino Unido , 22 de noviembre de 1995, § 42, Serie A nº 335 ‑ C, y SW c. Reino Unido , 22 de noviembre de 1995, § 44, Serie A nº 335 ‑ B; véase también, entre otras autoridades, Pretty c. Reino Unido , nº 2346/02 , § 65, CEDH 2002 ‑ III).
90. Además, existe un vínculo particularmente fuerte entre los conceptos de trato o castigo “degradante” en el sentido del artículo 3 del Convenio y el respeto por la “dignidad”. En 1973, la Comisión Europea de Derechos Humanos destacó que, en el contexto del artículo 3 del Convenio, la expresión “trato degradante” mostraba que el propósito general de esa disposición era prevenir interferencias particularmente graves con la dignidad humana (véase East African Asians v. the United Kingdom , núms. 4403/70 y otros 30, informe de la Comisión del 14 de diciembre de 1973, Decisions and Reports 78-A, pág. 56, § 192). El Tribunal, por su parte, hizo su primera referencia explícita a este concepto en la sentencia en Tyrer (citada anteriormente), relativa no al “trato degradante” sino al “castigo degradante”. Al determinar que el castigo en cuestión era degradante en el sentido del artículo 3 del Convenio, el Tribunal tuvo en cuenta el hecho de que “si bien el solicitante no sufrió efectos físicos graves o duraderos, su castigo – por el cual fue tratado como un objeto en poder de las autoridades – constituyó un ataque precisamente a lo que uno de los principales propósitos del Artículo 3 es proteger, a saber, la dignidad y la integridad física de una persona” (ibid., § 33). Muchas sentencias posteriores han destacado el estrecho vínculo entre los conceptos de “trato degradante” y el respeto por la “dignidad” (véase, por ejemplo, Kudła c. Polonia [GC], núm. 30210/96 , § 94, CEDH 2000 – XI; Valašinas c. Lituania , núm. 44558/98 , § 102, CEDH 2001 – VIII; Yankov c. Bulgaria , núm. 39084/97 , § 114, CEDH 2003 – XII; y Svinarenko y Slyadnev , citados anteriormente, § 138).
[Traducción de LP]
89. The word “dignity” appears in many international and regional texts and instruments (see paragraphs 45-47 above). Although the Convention does not mention that concept – which nevertheless appears in the Preamble to Protocol No. 13 to the Convention, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances – the Court has emphasised that respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the Convention (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, § 118), alongside human freedom (see C.R. v. the United Kingdom, 22 November 1995, § 42, Series A no. 335‑C, and S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 22 November 1995, § 44, Series A no. 335‑B; see also, among other authorities, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 65, ECHR 2002‑III).
90. Moreover, there is a particularly strong link between the concepts of “degrading” treatment or punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention and respect for “dignity”. In 1973 the European Commission of Human Rights stressed that in the context of Article 3 of the Convention the expression “degrading treatment” showed that the general purpose of that provision was to prevent particularly serious interferences with human dignity (see East African Asians v. the United Kingdom, nos. 4403/70 and 30 others, Commission’s report of 14 December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78-A, p. 56, § 192). The Court, for its part, made its first explicit reference to this concept in the judgment in Tyrer (cited above), concerning not “degrading treatment” but “degrading punishment”. In finding that the punishment in question was degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court had regard to the fact that “although the applicant did not suffer any severe or long-lasting physical effects, his punishment – whereby he was treated as an object in the power of the authorities – constituted an assault on precisely that which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely a person’s dignity and physical integrity” (ibid., § 33). Many subsequent judgments have highlighted the close link between the concepts of “degrading treatment” and respect for “dignity” (see, for example, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000‑XI; Valašinas v. Lithuania, no. 44558/98, § 102, ECHR 2001‑VIII; Yankov v. Bulgaria, no. 39084/97, § 114, ECHR 2003‑XII; and Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, § 138).
[Idioma original]
CASE OF BOUYID v. BELGIUM
(Application no. 23380/09)
In the case of Bouyid v. Belgium,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chambercomposed of:
Dean Spielmann, President,
Guido Raimondi,
Isabelle Berro,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Ledi Bianku,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Erik Møse,
Helen Keller,
Paul Lemmens,
Paul Mahoney,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Faris Vehabović,
Egidijus Kūris,
Iulia Motoc, judges,
and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 8 October 2014 and 24 June 2015,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the lastmentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 23380/09) against theKingdom of Belgium, lodged with the Court under Article 34 of theConvention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(“the Convention”) by two Belgian nationals, Mr Saïd Bouyid (“the firstapplicant”) and Mr Mohamed Bouyid (“the second applicant”), on 28 April2009.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr C. Marchand andMr Z. Chihaoui, lawyers practising in Brussels. The Belgian Government(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr M. Tysebaert,Senior Adviser, Federal Justice Department.
3. Alleging, in particular, that they were both slapped by police officerswhile they were in a police station, the applicants complained of degradingtreatment and argued that they were victims of a violation of Article 3.
4. The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court(Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). In a judgment delivered on 21 November 2013 a Chamber of that Section declared the application admissible in respect of the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention and the remainder inadmissible, and unanimously found that there had been no violation of Article 3. The Chamber was composed of Mark Villiger, President, Ann Power-Forde, Ganna Yudkivska, André Potocki, Paul Lemmens, Helena Jäderblom and Aleš Pejchal, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar. On 24 January 2014, under Article 43 of the Convention, the applicants requested referral of the case to the Grand Chamber. A panel of the Grand Chamber acceded to this request on 24 March 2014.
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