Fundamentos destacados: 87. Los malos tratos que alcanzan dicho nivel mínimo de gravedad suelen implicar lesiones corporales reales o sufrimiento físico o mental intenso. Sin embargo, incluso en ausencia de estos aspectos, cuando el trato humilla o degrada a una persona, mostrando una falta de respeto o menoscabando su dignidad humana, o suscitando sentimientos de miedo, angustia o inferioridad capaces de quebrantar su resistencia moral y física, puede caracterizarse como degradante y también caer dentro de la prohibición establecida en el artículo 3 (véanse, entre otras autoridades, Vasyukov c. Rusia , n.º 2974/05 , § 59, 5 de abril de 2011; Gäfgen , citado anteriormente, § 89; Svinarenko y Slyadnev , citado anteriormente, § 114; y Georgia c. Rusia (I) , citado anteriormente, § 192). También hay que señalar que puede ser suficiente que la víctima sea humillada a sus propios ojos, aunque no a los ojos de los demás (véase, entre otras autoridades, Tyrer c. Reino Unido , 25 de abril de 1978, § 32, Serie A no. 26, y MSS c. Bélgica y Grecia [GC], no. 30696/09 , § 220, CEDH 2011).
88. Además, en vista de los hechos del caso, la Corte considera particularmente importante señalar que, respecto de una persona que se encuentra privada de su libertad o, más generalmente, que se enfrenta a agentes del orden público, todo recurso a la fuerza física que no haya sido hecha estrictamente necesaria por su propia conducta menoscaba la dignidad humana y es, en principio, una violación del derecho establecido en el artículo 3 (véanse, entre otras autoridades, Ribitsch , § 38; Mete y otros , § 106; y El – Masri , § 207, todos citados anteriormente).
103. En todo caso, el Tribunal subraya que una bofetada infligida por un agente de la ley a un individuo que está totalmente bajo su control constituye un grave atentado a la dignidad de ese individuo.
[Traducción de LP]
87. Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these aspects, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Vasyukov v. Russia, no. 2974/05, § 59, 5 April 2011; Gäfgen, cited above, § 89; Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, § 114; and Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, § 192). It should also be pointed out that it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others (see, among other authorities, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 32, Series A no. 26, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 220, ECHR 2011).
88. Furthermore, in view of the facts of the case, the Court considers it particularly important to point out that, in respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is, in principle, an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Ribitsch, § 38; Mete and Others, § 106; and El‑Masri, § 207, all cited above).
103. In any event, the Court emphasises that a slap inflicted by a law-enforcement officer on an individual who is entirely under his control constitutes a serious attack on the individual’s dignity.
[Idioma original]
CASE OF BOUYID v. BELGIUM
(Application no. 23380/09)
In the case of Bouyid v. Belgium,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chambercomposed of:
Dean Spielmann, President,
Guido Raimondi,
Isabelle Berro,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Ledi Bianku,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Erik Møse,
Helen Keller,
Paul Lemmens,
Paul Mahoney,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Faris Vehabović,
Egidijus Kūris,
Iulia Motoc, judges,
and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 8 October 2014 and 24 June 2015,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the lastmentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 23380/09) against theKingdom of Belgium, lodged with the Court under Article 34 of theConvention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(“the Convention”) by two Belgian nationals, Mr Saïd Bouyid (“the firstapplicant”) and Mr Mohamed Bouyid (“the second applicant”), on 28 April2009.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr C. Marchand andMr Z. Chihaoui, lawyers practising in Brussels. The Belgian Government(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr M. Tysebaert,Senior Adviser, Federal Justice Department.
3. Alleging, in particular, that they were both slapped by police officerswhile they were in a police station, the applicants complained of degradingtreatment and argued that they were victims of a violation of Article 3.
4. The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court(Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). In a judgment delivered on 21 November 2013 a Chamber of that Section declared the application admissible in respect of the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention and the remainder inadmissible, and unanimously found that there had been no violation of Article 3. The Chamber was composed of Mark Villiger, President, Ann Power-Forde, Ganna Yudkivska, André Potocki, Paul Lemmens, Helena Jäderblom and Aleš Pejchal, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar. On 24 January 2014, under Article 43 of the Convention, the applicants requested referral of the case to the Grand Chamber. A panel of the Grand Chamber acceded to this request on 24 March 2014.
[Continúa…]
