Fundamento destacado: 47. El Tribunal considera que, en principio, los Estados tienen un interés legítimo en excluir a ciertos infractores de la profesión de contador público. Sin embargo, el Tribunal también considera que, a diferencia de otras condenas por delitos graves, una condena por negarse a llevar el uniforme militar por motivos religiosos o filosóficos no puede implicar deshonestidad ni vileza moral que pueda menoscabar la capacidad del infractor para ejercer esta profesión. Por lo tanto, la exclusión del solicitante por no ser una persona apta no estaba justificada. El Tribunal toma nota del argumento del Gobierno de que quienes se niegan a servir a su país deben ser castigados adecuadamente. No obstante, también observa que el solicitante cumplió una pena de prisión por negarse a llevar el uniforme militar. En estas circunstancias, el Tribunal considera que la imposición de una sanción adicional al solicitante fue desproporcionada. De lo anterior se desprende que la exclusión del solicitante de la profesión de contador público no perseguía un fin legítimo. En consecuencia, el Tribunal considera que no existía ninguna justificación objetiva y razonable para no tratar al solicitante de manera diferente a otras personas condenadas por un delito grave.
[Traducción de Lp]
47. The Court considers that, as a matter of principle, States have a legitimate interest to exclude some offenders from the profession of chartered accountant. However, the Court also considers that, unlike other convictions for serious criminal offences, a conviction for refusing on religious or philosophical grounds to wear the military uniform cannot imply any dishonesty or moral turpitude likely to undermine the offender’s ability to exercise this profession. Excluding the applicant on the ground that he was an unfit person was not, therefore, justified. The Court takes note of the Government’s argument that persons who refuse to serve their country must be appropriately punished. However, it also notes that the applicant did serve a prison sentence for his refusal to wear the military uniform. In these circumstances, the Court considers that imposing a further sanction on the applicant was disproportionate. It follows that the applicant’s exclusion from the profession of chartered accountants did not pursue a legitimate aim. As a result, the Court finds that there existed no objective and reasonable justification for not treating the applicant differently from other persons convicted of a serious crime.
[Idioma original]
CASE OF THLIMMENOS v. GREECE
(Application no. 34369/97)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6 April 2000
In the case of Thlimmenos v. Greece,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr L. WILDHABER, President,
Mrs E. PALM,
Mr L. FERRARI BRAVO,
Mr L. CAFLISCH,
Mr J.-P. COSTA,
Mr W. FUHRMANN,
Mr K. JUNGWIERT,
Mr M. FISCHBACH,
Mr B. ZUPANČIČ,
Mrs N. VAJIĆ,
Mr J. HEDIGAN,
Mrs W. THOMASSEN,
Mrs M. TSATSA-NIKOLOVSKA,
Mr T. PANŢÎRU,
Mr E. LEVITS,
Mr K. TRAJA,
Mr G. KOUMANTOS, ad hoc judge,
and also of Mrs M. DE BOER-BUQUICCHIO, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 December 1999 and 15 March 2000,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court in accordance with the provisions applicable prior to the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)[1], by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 22 March 1999 (Article 5 § 4 of Protocol No. 11 and former Articles 47 and 48 of the Convention).
2. The case originated in an application (no. 34369/97) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Commission under former Article 25 of the Convention by a Greek national, Mr Iakovos Thlimmenos (“the applicant”), on 18 December 1996. The applicant alleged that the refusal of the authorities to appoint him to a post of chartered accountant on account of his criminal conviction for disobeying, because of his religious beliefs, the order to wear the military uniform was in breach of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention and that the proceedings he had instituted in the Supreme Administrative Court in this connection were not conducted in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In his observations submitted on 20 October 1997 in reply to the observations of the Greek Government (“the Government”) on the admissibility and merits of the case, he also complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
3. The Commission declared the application partly admissible on 12 January 1998. In its report of 4 December 1998 (former Article 31 of the Convention), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 14 (twentytwo votes to six); that it was not necessary to examine whether there had been a violation of Article 9 taken on its own (twenty-one votes to seven); and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (unanimously)[1].
4. On 31 March 1999 a panel of the Grand Chamber determined that the case should be decided by the Grand Chamber (Rule 100 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Mr C. Rozakis, the judge elected in respect of Greece, who had taken part in the Commission’s examination of the case, withdrew from sitting in the Grand Chamber (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Mr G. Koumantos to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
5. The applicant and the Government each filed a memorial.
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