Fundamento destacado: 193. 4. a) Por lo que respecta al control constitucional de la cadena perpetua, se ha demostrado, especialmente a la luz del art. 1 de la Ley Fundamental y el principio del Estado de Derecho, que la cadena perpetua compatible con la dignidad humana sólo puede garantizarse si el condenado tiene una posibilidad concreta y, en principio, viable de recuperar la libertad en algún momento futuro; el núcleo de la dignidad humana se ve afectado si el condenado pierde toda esperanza de recuperar la libertad, independientemente del desarrollo de su personalidad. Esta esperanza, que desde el punto de vista del concepto de dignidad humana es precisamente lo que hace aceptable la ejecución de una pena de cadena perpetua, debe garantizarse de conformidad con los requisitos constitucionales; la posibilidad de ser indultado no es suficiente a este respecto.
[Traducción de LP]
193. 4. a) With regard to constitutional review of life imprisonment, it has been shown, especially in light of Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law and the principle of the rule of law, that life imprisonment that is compatible with human dignity can only be ensured if the convicted has a specific and, in principle, viable chance of regaining liberty at some point in the future; the core of human dignity is affected if the convicted should lose any hope of regaining liberty, regardless of their personality development. Such hope, which in view of the concept of human dignity is the very thing that makes the enforcement of a life sentence acceptable, must be ensured in accordance with the constitutional requirements; the possibility of being pardoned is not sufficient in this respect.
[Idioma original]
Headnotes
to the Judgment of the First Senate of 21 June 1977
– 1 BvL 14/76 –
1. Life imprisonment for murder under specific aggravating circumstances (Mord; § 211(1) of the Criminal Code) is compatible with the Basic Law as set forth in the following headnotes.
2. Based on the information currently available, and in consideration of the current practice of granting pardons, it cannot be found that enforcement of life sentences in accordance with the provisions of the Prison Act necessarily results in irreparable psychological or physical harm that violates human dignity (Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law).
3. Among the prerequisites for a prison sentence that is compatible with human dignity is the requirement that, in principle, a person sentenced to life imprisonment must retain the chance of regaining liberty at some point in the future. The possibility of a pardon is not sufficient. Rather, the principle of the rule of law requires that the statutory law set out conditions under which the enforcement of a life sentence can be suspended and the applicable procedures in such cases.
4. The classification of the act of killing someone perfidiously or killing in order to cover up another offence as murder under specific aggravating circumstances pursuant to § 211(2) of the Criminal Code does not, under a narrow interpretation of such provision that corresponds with the constitutional principle of proportionality, violate the Basic Law.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
– 1 BvL 14/76 –
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE
In the proceedings
for constitutional review
of § 211 of the Criminal Code as amended by the First Act to Reform the Criminal Law of 25 June 1969, newly promulgated on 2 January 1975 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 1),
– Order of Suspension and Referral from the Verden Regional Court, Ninth Grand Criminal Division, of 5 March 1976 (3 Ks 3/75) –
the Federal Constitutional Court – First Senate – with the participation of Justices
President Benda
Haager
Rupp-v. Brünneck
Böhmer
Simon
Faller
Hesse
Katzenstein
held on the basis of the oral hearing of 22 and 23 March 1977:
Judgment:
§ 211 of the Criminal Code as amended by the First Act to Reform the Criminal Law of 25 June 1969, newly promulgated on 2 January 1975 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 1), is compatible with the Basic Law as set forth in the reasons to this judgment, insofar as persons who have committed murder under specific aggravating circumstances by killing someone perfidiously or in order to cover up another offence are sentenced to life imprisonment.
Reasons:
A.
The proceedings concern the question of whether life imprisonment for murder under specific aggravating circumstances (Mord), defined as the killing of a person perfidiously or in order to cover up another offence, is compatible with the Basic Law.
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