Fundamentos destacados: 33. El Tribunal no puede aceptar estos argumentos. Observa, en primer lugar, que desde el inicio de su solicitud a la Comisión, de 14 de enero de 1986, el solicitante se quejó de que «su correspondencia con sus abogados y la Comisión Europea de Derechos Humanos ha sido objeto de injerencias periódicas, al ser abierta, examinada, examinada y censurada por las autoridades penitenciarias». Añadió que se le restringieron los contactos con su abogado y la Comisión porque sabía que «esta correspondencia sería leída (…) y tomada en cuenta por las autoridades penitenciarias». El Tribunal observa, además, que el Gobierno no cuestionó que la correspondencia entrante y saliente del solicitante con su abogado, salvo la relativa a una petición a la Comisión, pudiera examinarse con arreglo al Reglamento Penitenciario. De hecho, el SHHD había informado al solicitante y a su abogado de que esta correspondencia estaba sujeta a la normativa vigente que preveía la apertura y lectura de dichas cartas (véanse los párrafos 13 y 14 supra). En estas circunstancias, el solicitante puede alegar ser víctima de una injerencia en su derecho al respeto de la correspondencia en virtud del artículo 8 (art. 8).
Versión traducida al español
33. The Court cannot accept these arguments. It notes in the first place that from the outset in his application to the Commission of 14 January 1986 the applicant complained that «his correspondence with his solicitors and the European Commission of Human Rights has regularly been subjected to interference in so far as it has been opened, perused, scrutinised and censored by the prison authorities». He added that he was restricted in his contacts with his solicitor and the Commission because he knew that «this correspondence will be read (…) and noted by the prison authorities». The Court further observes that the Government did not dispute that the applicant’s incoming and outgoing correspondence with his solicitor, other than that concerning a petition to the Commission, could be examined under the Prison Rules. Indeed, the SHHD had informed the applicant and his solicitor that this correspondence was subject to the existing rules which provided for the opening and reading of such letters (see paragraphs 13-14 above). In these circumstances, the applicant can claim to be a victim of an interference with his right to respect for correspondence under Article 8 (art. 8).
Versión original en inglés
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COURT (CHAMBER)
CASE OF CAMPBELL V. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Application no. 13590/88)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 March 1992
In the case of Campbell v. the United Kingdom,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms («the Convention») and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr J. CREMONA, President,
Mr J. PINHEIRO FARINHA,
Mr R. MACDONALD,
Mr A. SPIELMANN,
Mr S.K. MARTENS,
Mr I. FOIGHEL,
Mr R. PEKKANEN,
Mr J.M. MORENILLA,
Sir John FREELAND,
and also of Mr M.-A. EISSEN, Registrar, and Mr H. PETZOLD, Deputy
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 September 1991 and 28 February
1992,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court on 12 October 1990 by the European Commission of Human Rights («the Commission») and by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland («the Government») on 22 November 1990, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 13590/88) against the United Kingdom lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 14 January 1986 by Thomas Campbell, a British citizen.
The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46), and the Government’s application to Article 48 (art. 48).
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