Fundamento destacado: 22. En el presente asunto, el Tribunal de Justicia observa que las acusaciones penales impugnadas fueron formuladas por una empresa que, indiscutiblemente, tiene derecho a defenderse de las acusaciones difamatorias. En este contexto, el Tribunal de Justicia admite que, además del interés público en un debate abierto sobre las prácticas empresariales, existe un interés concurrente en proteger el éxito comercial y la viabilidad de las empresas, en beneficio de los accionistas y de los empleados, pero también del bien económico en general. Por lo tanto, el Estado goza de un margen de apreciación en cuanto a los medios que proporciona en virtud del Derecho interno para permitir que una empresa impugne la veracidad, y limite el daño, de las alegaciones que corren el riesgo de perjudicar su reputación (véanse Steel y Morris c. el Reino Unido, nº 68416/01, § 94, TEDH 2005-II; Kuliś y Różycki c. Polonia, nº 27209/03, § 35, TEDH 2009-…). Sin embargo, existe una diferencia entre los intereses de la reputación comercial de una empresa y la reputación de un individuo en relación con su estatus social. Mientras que estos últimos pueden tener repercusiones en la dignidad de la persona, para el Tribunal de Justicia los intereses de la reputación comercial carecen de esa dimensión moral. En el presente recurso, el interés de reputación en juego es el de una sociedad estatal; se trata, pues, de un interés comercial sin relevancia para el carácter moral.
[Traducción de LP]
22. In the present case, the Court observes that the impugned criminal charges were pressed by a company which undisputedly has a right to defend itself against defamatory allegations. In this context the Court accepts that, in addition to the public interest in open debate about business practices, there is a competing interest in protecting the commercial success and viability of companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, but also for the wider economic good. The State therefore enjoys a margin of appreciation as to the means it provides under domestic law to enable a company to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, of allegations which risk harming its reputation (see Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 94, ECHR 2005-II; Kuliś and Różycki v. Poland, no. 27209/03, § 35, ECHR 2009‑…). However, there is a difference between the commercial reputational interests of a company and the reputation of an individual concerning his or her social status. Whereas the latter might have repercussions on one’s dignity, for the Court interests of commercial reputation are devoid of that moral dimension. In the instant application, the reputational interest at stake is that of a State-owned corporation; it is thus a commercial one without relevance to moral character.
[Idioma original]
CASE OF UJ v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 23954/10)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 July 2011
FINAL
19/10/2011
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It
may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Uj v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Dragoljub Popović,
Giorgio Malinverni,
András Sajó,
Guido Raimondi,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 28 June 2011,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 23954/10) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Péter Uj (“the applicant”), on 22 April 2010.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr L. Baltay, a lawyer practising in Gyál. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
3. The applicant alleged that his prosecution for criticising the quality of a certain type of wine amounted to a breach of his right to freedom of expression.
4. On 15 June 2010 the President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Budaörs.
6. On 2 January 2008 the applicant, a journalist, published an article in a column entitled “Opinion” of a national daily paper. The subject of the article was the quality of a well-known Hungarian wine variety, a product of T. Zrt, a State-owned corporation, which was, in the applicant’s view, bad and its popularity with Hungarian consumers unjustified. The article contained the following passage:
“On nine out of ten occasions, it is a product of T. Zrt, available below 1,000 [Hungarian forints] per bottle, that represents the world’s best wine region, the Hungarian National Pride and Treasure… [and that could make me cry]. Not only because of the taste – although that alone would easily be enough for an abundant cry: sour, blunt and over-oxidised stuff, bad-quality ingredients collected from all kinds of leftovers, grey mould plus a bit of sugar from Szerencs, musty barrel – but because we are still there …: hundreds of thousands of Hungarians drink [this] shit with pride, even devotion… our long-suffering people are made to eat (drink) it and pay for it at least twice ([because we are talking about a] State-owned company); it is being explained diligently, using the most jerk-like demagogy from both left and right, that this is national treasure, this is how it is supposed to be made, out of the money of all of us, and this is very, very good, and we even need to be happy about it with a solemn face. This is how the inhabitants (subjects) of the country are being humiliated by the skunk regime through half a litre of alcoholised drink.
And once again, I would remind everybody of how people were whining back then, saying that foreigners were coming to destroy [T.], buy up the market and make everything multinational and alien-hearted; and then it turned out that those foreigners made gorgeous wine, just like some lucky, resolute and very talented Hungarian family wineries, that they tried to make [T.] world-famous again, because this was their business interest (profit, ugh!); while we as a community are trying to destroy their achievements using State money, lest something finally could be a success. …”
7. T. Zrt filed a criminal complaint against the applicant. On 2 June 2009 the Budapest II/III District Court convicted him of defamation (rágalmazás). The court held that the criticism expressed in the applicant’s article went beyond the boundaries of journalistic opinion and amounted to stating a fact susceptible of harming the reputation of the producer of the wine variety in question. The court refrained from imposing a sentence for a probationary period of one year.
[Continúa…]
