Fundamentos destacados: 52. Sin embargo, en opinión del Tribunal, el presente asunto debe distinguirse del asunto Pretty antes citado. Al igual que el Tribunal Federal, considera oportuno señalar de entrada que el presente asunto no se refiere a la libertad de morir ni a la posible inmunidad de una persona que presta asistencia en un suicidio. El objeto de controversia en este caso es si, en virtud del artículo 8 del Convenio, el Estado debe garantizar que el demandante pueda obtener una sustancia letal, el pentobarbital sódico, sin prescripción médica, como excepción a la legislación, para suicidarse sin dolor y sin riesgo de fracaso. En otras palabras, a diferencia del asunto Pretty, el Tribunal de Primera Instancia observa que el demandante alega no sólo que su vida es difícil y dolorosa, sino también que, de no obtener la sustancia en cuestión, el propio acto del suicidio quedaría despojado de dignidad. Además, y de nuevo a diferencia del asunto Pretty, el demandante no puede ser considerado enfermo, en la medida en que no se encuentra en la fase terminal de una enfermedad degenerativa incurable que le impediría quitarse la vida (véase, a la inversa, la sentencia Pretty, antes citada, apartado 9).
[…]
56. Por lo que respecta a la ponderación de los intereses en conflicto en el presente asunto, el Tribunal de Justicia comprende el deseo del demandante de suicidarse de forma segura y digna y sin dolor ni sufrimiento innecesarios, en particular habida cuenta del elevado número de tentativas de suicidio que fracasan y que con frecuencia tienen graves consecuencias para las personas afectadas y para sus familias. Sin embargo, opina que la reglamentación establecida por las autoridades suizas, a saber, la exigencia de obtener una prescripción médica, persigue, entre otros, los objetivos legítimos de proteger a todos de decisiones precipitadas y evitar abusos y, en particular, garantizar que un paciente falto de discernimiento no obtenga una dosis letal de pentobarbital sódico (véase, mutatis mutandis, en relación con las restricciones al aborto, Tysiąc c. Polonia, nº. 5410/03, § 116, ECHR 2007-I).
57. Estas regulaciones son tanto más necesarias en el caso de un país como Suiza, donde la legislación y la práctica permiten un acceso relativamente fácil al suicidio asistido. Cuando un país adopta un enfoque liberal en este sentido, son necesarias medidas de aplicación adecuadas para dicho enfoque y medidas preventivas. La introducción de tales medidas también pretende evitar que las organizaciones que prestan asistencia al suicidio actúen de forma ilegal y en secreto, con riesgos de abuso significativos.
[Traducción LP]
52. In the Court’s opinion, however, the instant case is to be distinguished from the above-cited Pretty case. Like the Federal Court, it considers that it is appropriate to state at the outset that the instant case does not concern the freedom to die and possible immunity for a person providing assistance with a suicide. The subject of dispute in this case is whether, under Article 8 of the Convention, the State must ensure that the applicant can obtain a lethal substance, sodium pentobarbital, without a medical prescription, by way of derogation from the legislation, in order to commit suicide painlessly and without risk of failure. In other words, unlike the Pretty case, the Court observes that the applicant alleges not only that his life is difficult and painful, but also that, if he does not obtain the substance in question, the act of suicide itself would be stripped of dignity. In addition, and again in contrast to the Pretty case, the applicant cannot in fact be considered infirm, in that he is not at the terminal stage of an incurable degenerative disease which would prevent him from taking his own life (see, conversely, Pretty, cited above, § 9).
[…]
56. With regard to the balancing of the competing interests in this case, the Court is sympathetic to the applicant’s wish to commit suicide in a safe and dignified manner and without unnecessary pain and suffering, particularly given the high number of suicide attempts that are unsuccessful and which frequently have serious consequences for the individuals concerned and for their families. However, it is of the opinion that the regulations put in place by the Swiss authorities, namely the requirement to obtain a medical prescription, pursue, inter alia, the legitimate aims of protecting everybody from hasty decisions and preventing abuse, and, in particular, ensuring that a patient lacking discernment does not obtain a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital (see, mutatis mutandis, with regard to restrictions on abortion, Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, § 116, ECHR 2007-I).
57. Such regulations are all the more necessary in respect of a country such as Switzerland, where the legislation and practice allow for relatively easy access to assisted suicide. Where a country adopts a liberal approach in this manner, appropriate implementing measures for such an approach and preventive measures are necessary. The introduction of such measures is also intended to prevent organisations which provide assistance with suicide from acting unlawfully and in secret, with significant risks of abuse.
[Idioma Original]
CASE OF HAAS v. SWITZERLAND
(Application no. 31322/07)
In the case of Haas v. Switzerland,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 14 December 2010, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 31322/07) against the Swiss Confederation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Swiss national, Mr Ernst G. Haas (“the applicant”), on 18 July 2007.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr P.A. Schaerz, a lawyer practising in Uster (Canton of Zürich). The Swiss Government (“the overnment”) were represented by their Agent, Mr F. Schürmann, Head of the Human Rights and Council of Europe Section at the Federal Office of Justice.
3. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that his right to decide how and when to end his life had been breached.
4. By a decision of 20 May 2010, the Court declared the application admissible.
5. The Government filed further observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1 of the Rules of Court). In addition, third-party comments were received from Dignitas (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention), a Swiss private-law association whose aim is to ensure that its members are able to live and to die with dignity.
[Continúa…]
