Fundamento destacado: 28. Observa a este respecto que la corte de la ley marcial alcanzó un veredicto en casi siete años y cuatro meses. Tomó el Tribunal Militar de Casación, al que el solicitante apeló contra su condena, más de cuatro años para declarar sobre la apelación del solicitante. Además, el Tribunal de Casación emitió un fallo el 27 de diciembre de 1995, aproximadamente dos años después de haber sido detenido del caso. El tribunal no disputa la afirmación del gobierno de que la demora en la entrega de una sentencia final sobre el caso del solicitante fue causada en gran medida por la complejidad del caso. El tribunal observa además que los cambios legislativos resultantes de la transferencia de la jurisdicción sobre el caso de los tribunales militares a los civiles fueron un factor que contribuyó a la demora en cuestión.
29. Sin embargo, el Tribunal recuerda a este respecto que, como ha sostenido repetidamente, el Artículo 6 § 1 impone a la contratación establece el deber de organizar su sistema judicial de tal manera que sus tribunales puedan cumplir con cada uno de sus requisitos, incluida la obligación de escuchar casos dentro de un tiempo razonable (ver, entre otras autoridades, Pelissier y Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, §, § 79, § 79, § 79, § 79, § 79, § 79, § 79. Por lo tanto, la demora en los procedimientos penales contra el solicitante debe atribuirse a las autoridades nacionales. Por estas razones, el tribunal concluye que la duración del procedimiento penal no cumplió con el requisito de ‘tiempo razonable’.
[Traducción de LP]
28. It observes in this connection that the Martial-Law Court reached a verdict in almost seven years and four months. It took the Military Court of Cassation, to which the applicant appealed against his conviction, more than four years to rule on the applicant’s appeal. Furthermore, the Court of Cassation gave judgment on 27 December 1995, approximately two years after it had been seised of the case. The Court does not dispute the Government’s assertion that the delay in the delivery of a final judgment on the applicant’s case was caused to a large extent by the complexity of the case. The Court further observes that the legislative changes resulting from transfer of the jurisdiction over the case from the military courts to civil ones was a factor contributing to the delay at issue.
29. However, the Court recalls in this respect that, as it has repeatedly held, Article 6 § 1 imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial system in such a way that their courts can meet each of its requirements, including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time (see, among other authorities, Pelissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-II). Therefore, the delay in the criminal proceedings against the applicant must be attributed to the national authorities. For these reasons the Court concludes that the length of the criminal proceedings failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
[Idioma original]
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF ŞAHİNER v. TURKEY
(Application no. 29279/95)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 September 2001
FINAL
25/12/2001
In the case of Şahiner v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mrs E. Palm, President,
Mr L. Ferrari Bravo,
Mr Gaukur Jörundsson,
Mr B. Zupančič,
Mr T. Panţîru,
Mr R. Maruste, judges,
Mr F. Gölcüklü, ad hoc judge,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 11 January 2000 and 4 September 2001,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 29279/95) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr İsmail Şahiner (“the 0applicant”), on 22 August 1995.
2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr A. Kalan, a lawyer practising in Ankara. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) did not designate an Agent for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the criminal proceedings brought against him had not been concluded within a “reasonable time” and that his right to a fair hearing had been breached on account of his conviction by the Ankara Martial-Law Court, which lacked independence and impartiality. He further submitted that he had been convicted on the basis of statements he had made to the police under duress and that his political opinions had constituted the basis for his conviction.
4. The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).
5. The application was allocated to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Mr R. Türmen, the judge elected in respect of Turkey, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Mr F. Gölcüklü to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
6. By a decision of 11 January 2000 [Note by the Registry. The Court’s decision is obtainable from the Registry], the Chamber declared admissible the applicant’s complaints concerning his right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal and declared the remainder of his complaints inadmissible.
7. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
[Continúa…]
