Fundamentos destacados: 103. La Gran Cámara nota al principio la importancia de las garantías que ofrecen el Artículo 5 § 3 a una persona arrestada. El propósito de esta disposición es garantizar que las personas arrestadas sean presentadas físicamente ante una autoridad judicial de inmediato. Dicho escrutinio judicial acelerado automático proporciona una medida importante de protección contra el comportamiento arbitrario, la detención del incomunicado y el maltrato (ver, entre otras autoridades, Brannigan y McBride v. Reino Unido, Juicio del 26 de mayo de 1993, Serie A no. 258-B, p. 55, §§§ 62-63; Aquilina v. Malta [GC], no. 2564-B, p. 55, §§§ 62-63; Aquilina v. Malta [GC], no. 2564-B, p. 55, §§§ 62-63; Aquilina v. Malta [GC], No. ECHR 1999 – III; Brogan y otros v. El Reino Unido, Juicio del 29 de noviembre de 1988, Serie A no. 145-B, pp. 31-32, § 58; y Dikme v. Turquía, no. 20869/92, § 66, ECHR 2000-VIII).
104. Habiendo examinado los argumentos de las partes, la Gran Cámara no ve una buena razón para estar en desacuerdo con los hallazgos de la Cámara, que fueron los siguientes:
“106. El tribunal ya ha señalado en varias ocasiones que la investigación de los delitos terroristas indudablemente presenta a las autoridades problemas especiales (ver Brogan y otros v. El Reino Unido, juicio del 29 de noviembre de 1988, Serie A no. 145-B, p. 33, § 61; Murray v. El Reino Unido, juicio del 28 de octubre de 1994, Serie A No. v. Turquía, [Sentencia del 18 de diciembre de 1996, informes de 1996-VI], p. Noviembre de 1997, informes 1997-VII], págs. 2623-24, § 44).
107. El tribunal señala que la custodia policial en emisión comenzó con el arresto del solicitante, ya sea muy tarde el 15 de febrero de 1999 o muy temprano el 16 de febrero de 1999. El solicitante se detuvo a custodia policial durante cuatro días hasta el 20 de febrero de 1999. En esa fecha se dictó una orden judicial que ampliaba el plazo tres días, es decir, hasta el 23 de febrero de 1999. El fiscal interrogó al demandante el 22 de febrero de 1999. El demandante compareció ante un juez por primera vez el 23 de febrero de 1999 y el juez, que era sin duda un «funcionario» en el sentido del artículo 5, apartado 3 (véase, entre otras autoridades, Sakık y otros, citado anteriormente, pág. 2615, apartado 12, y pág. 2624, apartado 45), ordenó su detención en espera de juicio. El periodo total que el demandante pasó así bajo custodia policial antes de ser llevado ante un juez ascendió a un mínimo de siete días.
108. El tribunal señala que en Brogan y otros sostuvieron que un período de cuatro días y seis horas bajo custodia policial sin supervisión judicial cayó fuera de las estrictas limitaciones en cuanto al tiempo permitido por el artículo 5 § 3, incluso cuando el objetivo era proteger a la comunidad en su conjunto del terrorismo (ver Brogan y otros, citados anteriormente, p. 33, § 62).
109. El tribunal no puede aceptar el argumento del gobierno de que las condiciones climáticas adversas eran en gran parte responsables del período de siete días que le tomó al solicitante ser presentado ante un juez. No se ha presentado pruebas ante el Tribunal que establece que el juez intentó llegar a la isla en la que el solicitante estaba siendo retenido para que este último pudiera ser llevado ante él dentro del período legal total de siete días permitidos para la custodia policial. El tribunal observa en ese sentido que la custodia policial realizó su curso ordinario bajo las reglas nacionales. Además de los cuatro días ordenados por la propia oficina del fiscal, el juez otorgó un período adicional de tres días después de examinar el caso sobre la base del archivo. Parece poco probable que el juez hubiera otorgado el tiempo adicional si hubiera tenido la intención de llevar al solicitante antes que él antes de que expirara.
110. El tribunal no puede, por lo tanto, aceptar que era necesario que el solicitante fuera detenido durante siete días sin ser llevado ante un juez”.
105. A la luz de todas las consideraciones anteriores, el tribunal sostiene que ha habido una violación del Artículo 5 § 3 de la Convención.
[Traducido por LP]
103. The Grand Chamber notes at the outset the importance of the guarantees afforded by Article 5 § 3 to an arrested person. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that arrested persons are physically brought before a judicial authority promptly. Such automatic expedited judicial scrutiny provides an important measure of protection against arbitrary behaviour, incommunicado detention and ill-treatment (see, among other authorities, Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 26 May 1993, Series A no. 258-B, p. 55, §§ 62-63; Aquilina v. Malta [GC], no. 25642/94, § 49, ECHR 1999‑III; Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145‑B, pp. 31-32, § 58; and Dikme v. Turkey, no. 20869/92, § 66, ECHR 2000-VIII).
104. Having examined the parties’ arguments, the Grand Chamber sees no good reason to disagree with the Chamber’s findings, which were as follows:
“106. The Court has already noted on a number of occasions that the investigation of terrorist offences undoubtedly presents the authorities with special problems (see Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B, p. 33, § 61; Murray v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300-A, p. 27, § 58; and Aksoy v. Turkey, [judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI], p. 2282, § 78). This does not mean, however, that the investigating authorities have carte blanche under Article 5 to arrest suspects for questioning, free from effective control by the domestic courts and, ultimately, by the Convention supervisory institutions, whenever they choose to assert that terrorism is involved (see Sakık and Others v. Turkey, [judgment of 26 November 1997, Reports 1997-VII], pp. 2623-24, § 44).
107. The Court notes that the police custody in issue commenced with the applicant’s arrest either very late on 15 February 1999 or very early on 16 February 1999. The applicant was held in police custody for four days until 20 February 1999. On that date a judicial order was made extending the period by three days, that is to say until 23 February 1999. The public prosecutor questioned the applicant on 22 February 1999. The applicant appeared before a judge for the first time on 23 February 1999 and the judge, who was without any doubt an ‘officer’ within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 (see, among other authorities, Sakık and Others, cited above, p. 2615, § 12, and p. 2624, § 45), ordered his detention pending trial. The total period thus spent by the applicant in police custody before being brought before a judge came to a minimum of seven days.
108. The Court notes that in Brogan and Others it held that a period of four days and six hours in police custody without judicial supervision fell outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by Article 5 § 3, even when the aim was to protect the community as a whole from terrorism (see Brogan and Others, cited above, p. 33, § 62).
109. The Court cannot accept the Government’s argument that adverse weather conditions were largely responsible for the period of seven days it took for the applicant to be brought before a judge. No evidence has been adduced before the Court that establishes that the judge attempted to reach the island on which the applicant was being held so that the latter could be brought before him within the total statutory period of seven days allowed for police custody. The Court observes in that connection that the police custody ran its ordinary course under the domestic rules. In addition to the four days ordered by the public prosecutor’s office itself, the judge granted an additional period of three days after examining the case on the basis of the file. It seems unlikely that the judge would have granted the additional time had he intended to have the applicant brought before him before it expired.
110. The Court cannot, therefore, accept that it was necessary for the applicant to be detained for seven days without being brought before a judge.”
105. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
[Idioma original]
CASE OF ÖCALAN v. TURKEY
(Application no. 46221/99)
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 46221/99) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Abdullah Öcalan (“the applicant”), on 16 February 1999.
2. The applicant was represented by Sir Sydney Kentridge, Mr M. Muller and Mr T. Otty, who are London barristers, and Ms A. Tuğluk of the Istanbul Bar. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Co-Agents in the present case, Mr Ş. Alpaslan, of the Istanbul Bar, and Mr M. Özmen.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, violations of various provisions of the Convention, namely Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of ill-treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial), 7 (no punishment without law), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), 13 (right to an effective remedy), 14 (prohibition of discrimination), 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) and 34 (right of individual application).
