Fundamentos destacados: 56. El Tribunal observa, en primer lugar, que el derecho a la libertad de reunión es un derecho fundamental en una sociedad democrática y, al igual que el derecho a la libertad de expresión, es uno de los fundamentos de dicha sociedad. Por lo tanto, no debe interpretarse de forma restrictiva (véase G. c. Alemania, n.º 13079/87, decisión de la Comisión de 6 de marzo de 1989, DR 60, pág. 256; Rassemblement jurassien y Unité jurassienne, antes citada, pág. 93; y Rai y otros c. Reino Unido, n.º 25522/94, decisión de la Comisión de 6 de abril de 1995, DR 81-A, pág. 146). Como tal, este derecho abarca tanto las reuniones privadas como las reuniones en la vía pública, así como las reuniones estáticas y las procesiones públicas; Además, puede ser ejercido por los particulares y por quienes organizan la reunión (Rassemblement jurassien et Unité jurassienne, antes citada, pág. 119, y Christians against Racism and Fascism c. the United Kingdom, n° 8440/78, decisión de la Comisión de 16 de julio de 1980, DR 21, pág. 138, en particular pág. 148).
57. El Tribunal señala además que los Estados no solo deben salvaguardar el derecho de reunión pacífica, sino también abstenerse de aplicar restricciones indirectas irrazonables a dicho derecho (véase Ezelin , citado anteriormente). Por último, el Tribunal considera que, si bien el objetivo esencial del artículo 11 es proteger a la persona contra la injerencia arbitraria de las autoridades públicas en el ejercicio de los derechos protegidos, puede haber, además, obligaciones positivas para garantizar el goce efectivo de estos derechos (véase Cristianos contra el Racismo y el Fascismo , citado anteriormente, pág. 148).
[Traducción de LP]
56. The Court observes at the outset that the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society. Thus, it should not be interpreted restrictively (see G. v. Germany, no. 13079/87, Commission decision of 6 March 1989, DR 60, p. 256; Rassemblement jurassien and Unité jurassienne, cited above, p. 93; and Rai and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 25522/94, Commission decision of 6 April 1995, DR 81-A, p. 146). As such this right covers both private meetings and meetings in public thoroughfares as well as static meetings and public processions; in addition, it can be exercised by individuals and those organising the assembly (Rassemblement jurassien and Unité jurassienne, cited above, p. 119, and Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom, no. 8440/78, Commission decision of 16 July 1980, DR 21, p. 138, at p. 148).
57. The Court notes in addition that States must not only safeguard the right to assemble peacefully but also refrain from applying unreasonable indirect restrictions upon that right (see Ezelin, cited above). Lastly, the Court considers that, although the essential object of Article 11 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the exercise of the rights protected, there may in addition be positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of these rights (see Christians against Racism and Facism, cited above, p. 148).
[Idioma original]
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF DJAVIT AN v. TURKEY
(Application no. 20652/92)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 February 2003
FINAL
09/07/2003
In the case of Djavit An v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr L. CAFLISCH, President,
Mr P. KŪRIS,
Mr B. ZUPANČIČ,
Mr J. HEDIGAN,
Mrs M. TSATSA-NIKOLOVSKA,
Mr K. TRAJA, judges,
Mr F. GÖLCÜKLÜ, ad hoc judge,
and Mr V. BERGER, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 30 January 2003,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 20652/92) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Cypriot national, Mr Ahmet Djavit An (“the applicant”), on 8 September 1992.
2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr M. Shaw QC, practising in London. The Turkish Government (“the respondent Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z.M. Necatigil.
3. The applicant alleged a violation of Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention, on account of the refusal by the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to allow him to cross the “green line” into southern Cyprus in order to participate in bi-communal meetings.
4. The application was declared partly admissible by the Commission on 14 April 1998 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1999 in accordance with Article 5 § 3, second sentence, of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the Commission not having completed its examination of the case by that date.
5. The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Mr R. Türmen, the judge elected in respect of Turkey, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28). The respondent Government accordingly appointed Mr F. Gölcüklü to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
6. The applicant and the respondent Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). In addition, third-party comments were received from the Cypriot Government, which had exercised its right to intervene (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 61 § 2). The parties replied to those comments (Rule 61 § 5).
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