Fundamento destacado: 84. En el ámbito europeo, el Tribunal de Justicia observa que no existe un consenso sobre la naturaleza y el estatuto del embrión y/o del feto (véanse los apartados 39 y 40 de la presente sentencia), si bien éstos empiezan a recibir cierta protección a la luz del progreso científico y de las posibles consecuencias de la investigación en ingeniería genética, procreación médicamente asistida o experimentación con embriones. En el mejor de los casos, puede considerarse como un terreno común entre los Estados que el embrión/feto pertenece a la raza humana. La potencialidad de ese ser y su capacidad de convertirse en persona –que goza de protección en virtud del Derecho civil, por otra parte, en muchos Estados, como Francia, en el contexto de las sucesiones y donaciones, y también en el Reino Unido (véase el apartado 72 anterior)– exigen una protección en nombre de la dignidad humana, sin convertirla en una «persona» con el «derecho a la vida» en el sentido del artículo 2. En efecto, el Convenio de Oviedo sobre Derechos Humanos y Biomedicina se cuida de no dar una definición del término «todos», y en su exposición de motivos se indica que, a falta de un acuerdo unánime sobre la definición, los Estados miembros decidieron permitir que la legislación interna aportara aclaraciones a los efectos de la aplicación de dicho Convenio (véase el párrafo 36 supra). Lo mismo puede decirse del Protocolo Adicional sobre la Prohibición de la Clonación de Seres Humanos y del Protocolo Adicional sobre Investigación Biomédica, que no definen el concepto de «ser humano» (véanse los párrafos 37 y 38 supra). Cabe señalar que, en virtud del artículo 29 de la Convención de Oviedo, se puede solicitar a la Corte que emita opiniones consultivas sobre la interpretación de dicho instrumento.
[Traducción de LP]
84. At European level, the Court observes that there is no consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus (see paragraphs 39-40 above), although they are beginning to receive some protection in the light of scientific progress and the potential consequences of research into genetic engineering, medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation. At best, it may be regarded as common ground between States that the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being and its capacity to become a person – enjoying protection under the civil law, moreover, in many States, such as France, in the context of inheritance and gifts, and also in the United Kingdom (see paragraph 72 above) – require protection in the name of human dignity, without making it a “person” with the “right to life” for the purposes of Article 2. The Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, indeed, is careful not to give a definition of the term “everyone”, and its explanatory report indicates that, in the absence of a unanimous agreement on the definition, the member States decided to allow domestic law to provide clarification for the purposes of the application of that Convention (see paragraph 36 above). The same is true of the Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings and the Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research, which do not define the concept of “human being” (see paragraphs 37-38 above). It is worth noting that the Court may be requested under Article 29 of the Oviedo Convention to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of that instrument.
[Idioma original]
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF VO v. FRANCE
(Application no. 53924/00)
In the case of Vo v. France,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber
composed of:
Mr L. WILDHABER, President,
Mr C.L. ROZAKIS,
Mr J.-P. COSTA,
Mr G. RESS,
Sir Nicolas BRATZA,
Mr L. CAFLISCH,
Mrs V. STRÁŽNICKÁ,
Mr P. LORENZEN
Mr K. JUNGWIERT,
Mr M. FISCHBACH,
Mr J. HEDIGAN,
Mrs W. THOMASSEN,
Mr A.B. BAKA,
Mr K. TRAJA,
Mr M. UGREKHELIDZE,
Mrs A. MULARONI,
Mr K. HAJIYEV, judges,
and Mr P.J. MAHONEY, Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 10 December 2003 and 2 June 2004, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the lastmentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 53924/00) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national, Mrs Thi-Nho Vo (“the applicant”), on 20 December 1999.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr B. Le Griel, of the Paris Bar. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr R. Abraham, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on the ground that the conduct of a doctor who was responsible for the death of her child in utero was not classified as unintentional homicide.
4. The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber to which the case had been assigned decided on 22 May 2003 to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber with immediate effect, none of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).
5. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24.
6. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. In addition, observations were also received from the Center for Reproductive Rights and the Family Planning Association, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2).
7. A hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 December 2003 (Rule 59 § 3).
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