TEDH: «Derecho a un tribunal» garantiza no solo que la persona pueda reclamar sus derechos, sino también que decisiones definitivas no queden inoperantes [Hornsby vs. Grecia, f. j. 40]

Fundamento destacado: 40. La Corte reitera que, según reiterada jurisprudencia, el artículo 6, apartado 1 (art. 6-1) garantiza a toda persona el derecho a que se someta a un juzgado o tribunal toda reclamación relativa a sus derechos y obligaciones civiles; de este modo, encarna el «derecho a la justicia», del que es el derecho de acceso, es decir, el derecho a interponer un recurso judicial en materia civil. constituye un aspecto (véase la sentencia Philis c. Grecia de 27 de agosto de 1991, Serie A nº 209, p. 20, párr. 59). Sin embargo, ese derecho sería ilusorio si el ordenamiento jurídico interno de un Estado contratante permitiera que una decisión judicial firme y vinculante quedara sin efecto en detrimento de una de las partes. Sería inconcebible que en el párrafo 1 del artículo 6 (art. 6-1) se describieran en detalle las garantías procesales otorgadas a los litigantes -procedimientos justos, públicos y expeditos- sin proteger la aplicación de las decisiones judiciales; interpretar el artículo 6 (art. 6) en el sentido de que se refiere exclusivamente al acceso a un tribunal y al desarrollo del procedimiento podría conducir a situaciones incompatibles con el principio del Estado de Derecho que los Estados contratantes se comprometieron a respetar cuando ratificaron el Convenio (véase, mutatis mutandis, la sentencia Golder c. el Reino Unido de 21 Febrero de 1975, Serie A nº 18, pp. 16-18, párrs. 34-36). Por lo tanto, la ejecución de una sentencia dictada por un tribunal debe considerarse parte integrante del «juicio» a los efectos del artículo 6 (art. 6); además, el Tribunal ya ha aceptado este principio en casos relativos a la duración del proceso (véanse, más recientemente, las sentencias Di Pede c. Italia y Zappia c. Italia de 26 de septiembre de 1996, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1996-IV, pp. 1383-1384, párrs. 20 y 24, y pp. 1410 y 1411, párrs. 16 a 20, respectivamente).


COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COURT (CHAMBER)
CASE OF HORNSBY v. GREECE
(Application no. 18357/91)

In the case of Hornsby v. Greece[1],

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms («the Convention») and the relevant provisions
of Rules of Court A[2] , as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr R. BERNHARDT, President,
Mr F. GÖLCÜKLÜ,
Mr L.-E. PETTITI,
Mr A. SPIELMANN,
Mr N. VALTICOS,
Mr J.M. MORENILLA,
Sir John FREELAND,
Mr L. WILDHABER,
Mr D. GOTCHEV,
and also of Mr H. PETZOLD, Registrar, and Mr P.J. MAHONEY, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27 September 1996 and on 27 January
and 25 February 1997,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the lastmentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights («the Commission») on 11 December 1995, within the threemonth period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated in an application (no. 18357/91) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by two British nationals, Mr David Hornsby and Mrs Ada Ann Hornsby, on 7 January 1990. The applicants, who were designated by their initials during the proceedings before the Commission, subsequently consented to the disclosure of their identity.

The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Greece recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1).

2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicants stated that they did not wish to take part in the proceedings. The British Government, who had been notified by the Registrar of their right to intervene (Article 48 (b) of the Convention and Rule 33 para. 3 (b)) (art. 48-b), did not indicate any intention of so doing.

[Continúa…]

Descargue la resolución aquí


[1] The case is numbered 107/1995/613/701. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.

[2] Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9). They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.

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